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The impact of downside risk on UK stock returnsa 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to investigate patterns in UK stock returns related to 
downside risk, with particular focus on stock returns during financial crises.  
 
Design/Methodology/Approach – First, stocks are sorted into five quintile portfolios 
based on the relevant beta values (namely, classic beta, downside beta and upside beta, 
calculated by the moving window approach). Second, patterns of portfolio returns are 
examined during various sub-periods. Finally, predictive powers of beta and downside 
beta are examined.      
 
Findings – The downside risk is observed to have a significant positive impact on 
contemporaneous stock returns and a negative impact on future returns in general. In 
contrast, an inverse relationship between risk and return is observed when stocks are 
sorted by beta, contrary to the classic literature. UK stock returns exhibit clear time 
sensitivity, especially during financial crises.        
 
Originality/Value – This paper focuses on the impact of the downside risk on UK 
stock returns, assessed via a comprehensive sub-period analysis. This paper fills the 
gap in the existing literature, in which very few studies examine the time sensitivity in 
relation to the downside risk and the risk-return anomaly in the UK stock market 
using a long sample period.  
 
Keywords Downside risk, stock returns, financial crisis 
 
Paper type Research Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
a The author thanks Professor Nick Taylor for his valuable comments and suggestions.  
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1  Introduction 
This paper investigates the relationship between the downside risk and UK stock 
returns. Since the CAPM was first proposed, it was widely believed that the expected 
excess return of a stock varies linearly with its market beta, regardless of the change 
in the market excess return. However, by exploring market movements and stock 
returns, researchers observed that stock returns did not react symmetrically to market 
movements. Certain stocks tend to gain more in a rising market than they would lose 
in a falling market, while other stocks experience declines in a falling market far in 
excess of gains in a rising market. It follows that such stocks are less attractive than 
others due to low average payoffs. This paper demonstrates that the positive impact of 
the downside risk is reflected in the cross-section of stock returns, while when beta is 
controlled, the downside risk’s negative impact on stock returns is observed in future 
stock returns. It is also observed that risk and return follow an inverse relationship, 
when stocks are sorted by beta, contrary to the classic literature. Furthermore, to test 
the time sensitivity, the risk-return relationship is examined by using sub-period 
analysis. This paper fills the gap in the existing literature, in which studies primarily 
focus on either stock performance over time during a particular financial crisis 
(therefore, examining a relatively short sample period) or the downside risk without 
considering its time sensitivity. As stock performance varies substantially over time, 
especially during bear markets (Ang et al, 2006), this paper contributes to the 
literature by using a 30-year sample period, covering a number of economic cycles, 
and in particular examines the downside risk in relation to stock performance and 
3 
 
time sensitivity. This paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on the downside risk, section 3 outlines a downside risk model, section 4 
describes data, section 5 presents empirical results, section 6 examines the predictive 
power of the downside beta, and the final section concludes with a discussion of the 
present study’s limitations and points at directions for future research.   
 
2  Literature review 
Measures of the downside risk have long been used in portfolio analysis, specifically, 
because treating risk asymmetrically yields a vast improvement over the traditional 
portfolio theory. The most commonly accepted downside risk measures are 
semi-variance and the lower partial moment (Nawrocki, 1999). A number of studies 
focus on the asymmetry of risk, particularly on downside losses rather than upside 
gains. Roy (1952) pointed out that investors are more concerned with the downside 
risk than with upside gains. Markowitz (1959) was the first to propose that 
semi-variance instead of variance be adopted as a risk measure, as semi-variance is 
particularly focused on downside losses. Consequently, a large number of studies 
exploring theoretical applications of semi-variance have been published. For instance, 
the theoretical superiority of semi-variance compared to variance is illustrated in 
Quirk and Saposnik’s study (1962). Mao (1970) shows that investors are more 
sensitive to the downside risk as compared to upside gains. In the mid-1970s, another 
measure of downside risk called the lower partial moment was proposed. According 
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to Bawa (1975) and Fishburn (1977), the lower partial moment can liberate investors 
from risk seeking to risk neutral and finally to risk aversion. Bawa (1975) was the first 
to define the lower partial moment as a below-target semi-variance, linking the lower 
partial moment to the semi-variance measure.  
 
A large number of empirical tests have been conducted subsequent to the introduction 
of these two measures of the downside risk. Among such tests, a number of 
researchers attempted to combine measures of the downside risk with the original 
asset pricing model and the investors’ utility function. This, in turn, has led to the 
emergence of new measures of downside risk. Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) proposed 
a modified CAPM that treated downside and upside risks asymmetrically. Developing 
the framework for behavioural finance, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed the 
loss aversion preference. Gul (1991) advanced the disappointment aversion preference 
theory. According to that theory, risk-averse investors demand a premium to 
compensate for the downside risk borne in a falling market. Sing and Ong (1993) 
proposed the co-lower partial moment and extended it to classic CAPM. Ang and 
Chen (2002) proposed the downside conditional correlation as a new measure of 
downside risk. Moreover, Nielsen et al. (2008) proposed downside realized 
semi-variance as another measure of downside risk, constructed from high-frequency 
data.   
 
Even though the concept of downside risk arose as early as the 1950s, early studies 
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observed little evidence of downside risk being priced, as researchers did not 
specifically focus on the cross-sectional evaluation of the premium. For instance, 
Jahankani (1976) failed to observe any improvement in the standard CAPM resulting 
from normal betas being replaced by downside betas; however, portfolios used in his 
study were sorted only by classic CAPM betas. Similarly, Harlow and Rao (1989) 
failed to estimate the downside risk premium, instead measuring the downside risk 
under the maximum likelihood framework, with only the consistency of returns of the 
risk-free assets being tested across all portfolios. None of the cited studies examined 
the risk premiums of stocks that closely co-vary with a declining market. 
 
However, Ang et al. (2006) successfully demonstrated that stocks with higher 
downside risk boast higher average returns, with the downside risk a significant risk 
factor affecting stock returns. Moreover, they estimated the downside risk premium to 
be 6% per annum in cross-section. On the other hand, Huang and Hueng (2008) 
argued that in a downside market, there is a significant and negative risk-return 
relationship. More recently, Gregory (2011) focused on the UK stock market risk 
premium, though not specifically during downside markets. Huang et al. (2012) failed 
to observe the downside risk component in a Value-at-Risk model. Galsband (2012) 
and Alles and Murray (2017) observed stock returns to be sensitive to downside 
shocks in emerging markets. Additionally, Giglio et al. (2016), Min and Kim (2016) 
and Ormos and Timotity (2016) proposed modeling the downside risk from the 
macroeconomic perspective, while Theodosiadou et al. (2016) explored time 
6 
 
sensitivity of jumps in individual stock returns. In view of Ang et al. (2006), this 
paper examined whether individual UK stocks with higher downside betas earn, on 
average, higher returns during both the observation period and the next period, 
focusing particularly on time sensitivity of stock returns relative to the downside risk. 
 
3  A model of downside risk 
To price the downside risk theoretically, a disappointment aversion (DA) utility 
function first proposed by Gul (1991) is adopted. Use of the DA utility function 
effectively assumes that investors respond differently to downside losses compared to 
upside gains, specifically, with greater concern toward the former. A number of other 
models exist that focus on investors’ loss aversion: Shumway (1997) advanced a 
behavioural model accounting for the level of investors’ loss aversion, while Barberis 
and Huang (2001) developed a cross-sectional equilibrium model based on a 
risk-averse utility function with a mental accounting factor representing investors’ 
loss aversion. Moreover, certain improvements have been proposed, as well as 
constraints on utility functions. For instance, Chen et al. (2001) added the short sale 
constraint, while Kyle and Xiong (2001) constructed the wealth constraint. However, 
none of the cited models directly relate measurement of the downside risk to 
cross-sectional stock returns in a perfect market. 
 
Instead of adding too many constraints and behavioural conditions, taking the rational 
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disappointment aversion utility function as the basis for asymmetric treatment of risk 
is the most reasonable way to measure the downside risk cross-sectionally. The 
advantage of such an approach is that, as the DA function is universally concave, 
portfolio allocation problems, especially those of optimal finite portfolio allocation, 
are solvable (Ang et al., 2006). The difference between the DA utility function 
adopted in this paper and the one in Gul’s (1991) study is that the former is 
constructed under a rational representative agent framework, while the latter merely 
aims to solve the problem in an aggregate market, specifically in a consumption 
setting (Routledge and Zin, 2003). In this paper, wealth is measured by the market 
portfolio, with all assumptions complying with the CAPM.  
 
Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion utility function is as follows: 
1
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   ,               (1) 
where U(W) is the utility function of wealth W by the end of the period, F(x) is the 
cumulative density function of wealth W, and W is a certain level of wealth. 
Following Gul (1991), U(W) is set to be a power utility function given by 
(1 )( ) / (1 )U W W    .                     (2) 
The parameter A in equation (1) is the disappointment aversion coefficient, 0<A≤1, 
and K is a scalar, given by 
Pr( ) Pr( )W WK W A W     .                (3) 
The event of wealth declining below W it is called a disappointing outcome. The 
reason for A being between 0 and 1 is to allow disappointing outcomes to have more 
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weight than the alternative. In other words, disappointment-averse investors are more 
concerned with the downside risk than the upside risk. On the other hand, if A=1, the 
disappointment aversion utility function becomes the mean-variance utility function 
(Ang et al., 2006). 
 
A key component of the mean–variance utility function, the regular beta, is given by  
 
cov( , )
var( )
i M
M
xR xR
xR
  ,                       (4) 
where xRi is asset i’s excess return and xRM is the market excess return. Beta could be 
a powerful parameter to explain and describe the risk-return relationship of each asset, 
as each asset’s expected return will increase in a rising market and decrease in a 
declining market at high beta values. However, with investors comparatively more 
concerned with the downside risk, the disappointment aversion utility function’s risk 
coefficient does not have enough explanatory power for the downside risk. To 
overcome this challenge, the downside beta, denoted by β-, a measurement of 
downside risk, is introduced by Bawa and Lindenberg (1977)
1
. Mathematically, β- is 
given by 
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 ,                 (5) 
where 
MxR  is the average market excess return over the sample period. 
 
On the other hand, a DA investor would prefer to hold stocks with high upside 
                                                          
1 The downside beta measures the co-movement between the stock return and the return of market 
portfolio in a falling market. Stocks with larger downside betas are expected to suffer greater 
losses in a downside market, and vice versa. 
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potential payoffs available at discounts. Similarly to the downside beta, the upside 
beta is given by  
cov( , | )
var( | )
i M M M
M M M
xR xR xR xR
xR xR xR
 



 ,               (6) 
where the notation is used consistently with the definition of the downside beta.  
 
As the regular, upside and downside betas are not independent, to distinguish their 
effects, two more statistics were introduced by Ang et al. (2006) and further 
developed and tested in a number of studies, e.g., Galsband (2012), Liu et al. (2014), 
Min and Kim (2016) and Keenan and Sown (2017): the relative upside beta, denoted 
by (β+-β) and the relative downside beta, denoted by (β--β). In the subsequent analysis, 
comparisons among regular, upside, downside, relative upside and relative downside 
betas relative to stock returns are summarized.      
 
4  Data 
Data for the UK market used in this paper are taken from DataStream and include 
ordinary common stock prices of companies in the FTSE All-Share Index, observed 
monthly from December 1979 to December 2010. Real estate investment funds and 
closed-end funds are excluded from the sample. Each stock is required to have at least 
5 years of consecutive monthly adjusted price observations with at most 5 missing 
observations. The price of each stock is adjusted for splits, mergers and acquisitions, 
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and dividends (dividends are subtracted from stock prices to perform the adjustment), 
resulting in the total of 565 stocks with the average annual return of 3.61% and the 
standard deviation of 22.21%. The UK one-month Gilt rate and FTSE All-Share Index 
values over the same period are collected for subsequent analysis.   
 
5  Empirical results 
To demonstrate the relationship between annual realized stock returns and various 
types of betas, results are summarized in the subsequent tables. All regular, downside 
and upside betas are estimated by OLS, with relative downside and upside betas, and 
downside beta less upside beta values computed subsequently. 
  
In the process of computing betas, the moving window method is adopted with a 
three-year window used to calculate beta values for respective stocks. Therefore, once 
the first beta value for a given stock has been calculated, the next beta value for that 
stock is calculated by moving the window forward by one month. Once all types of 
betas have been computed, each type is sorted into five portfolios according to their 
values as of each month. Specifically, stocks are cross-sectionally sorted into five 
quintiles (113 stocks in each quintile), according to different types of corresponding 
beta measurements at each point in time. The low-beta portfolios contain stocks with 
the lowest 20% of betas among all stocks during each month, with the other four 
portfolios containing stocks, falling into 20 - 40%, 40 - 60%, 60 - 80% and 80 - 100% 
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percentile beta brackets. Once portfolios have been constructed, each portfolio’s 
equally weighted average beta is calculated and assigned to be the portfolio beta. To 
demonstrate the sample period’s impact and the predictive power of betas, both the 
same period and the following year’s average annual excess return of each portfolio 
are calculated.  
 
5.1   Whole sample analysis 
The sample used in this paper contains a number of bear market periods, e.g., the 
“1989 market crash”, the Dot-com crash and the subprime crisis. Overall, the UK 
sample is mostly characterized by bear markets; hence, unusual results are expected, 
and time sensitivity of downside and upside betas is observed. 
 
Table 1 shows that, when the entire sample is used, several unusual results in realized 
returns and beta measurements are observed. According to the conventional definition 
of the risk–return relationship, high beta values are expected to correspond to high 
returns, and vice versa. However, Table 1 presents the opposite result. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
When stocks are sorted by conventional beta values, the average beta estimate for the 
lowest beta portfolio is 0.32, while the estimate for the highest beta portfolio is 1.79, 
with the average beta estimates rising at relatively stable intervals from low to high, 
and the spread between the highest and the lowest beta estimates of 1.47. Although 
these beta estimates are smaller than expected, they are still within a reasonable range. 
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The average downside beta and upside beta estimates of 5 portfolios follow the 
direction of change, from low to high, of conventional beta estimates. Surprisingly, 
when it comes to realized returns, portfolios’ average realized returns are observed to 
vary inversely with the respective beta estimates. The lowest-beta portfolio generated 
the return of 1.94% per annum, while the highest-beta portfolio suffered a loss of 2.82% 
per annum, the difference between the high and the low-beta portfolio values being 
-4.76%. The realized returns show a decreasing trend, going from low-beta to 
high-beta portfolio.  
 
The same phenomenon is also observed when stocks are sorted by downside beta, 
upside beta and relative upside beta. When stocks are sorted by relative downside beta, 
returns exhibit a U-shaped pattern going from low-beta to high-beta portfolio. The 
annual return of the lowest relative downside beta portfolio is 0.3%, dropping below 
zero with the increase in relative downside beta. It then rises above zero, finally 
yielding 0.65% per annum for the highest relative downside beta portfolio. Although 
there is a tiny decline observed between the annual returns of the second highest and 
the highest relative downside beta portfolios, a U-shaped return pattern is still clearly 
observed.  
 
An upward trend of annual returns from low-beta to high-beta portfolios is finally 
observed when stocks are sorted by the difference between the downside beta and the 
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upside beta ( β- -β+ ). The annual return of the low ( β- -β+ ) portfolio is -3.62%, 
increasing with the rise in ( β- -β+ ) and reaching 2.9% for the high ( β- -β+ ) portfolio 
with the spread between high and low of 6.53%. Overall, Table 1 illustrates a 
surprising risk-return relationship with the pattern of returns being in complete 
contradiction with the conventional risk–return theory, and a non-linear relationship 
observed for stocks sorted by relative downside beta. 
 
5.2   Sub-period analysis 
The sample excluding the subprime crisis period 
To examine the risk–return relationship and time sensitivity of the downside risk in 
more detail (especially when a relatively long sample contains a number of crises), a 
number of short and reshaped samples are chosen. Table 2 provides results for the 
sub-period from January 1980 to December 2007. The reason for choosing to analyze 
this period is the subprime crisis. Omitting data from January 2008 to December 2010 
from the original dataset has the effect of removing the influence of the global 
financial crisis. Table 2 shows that, after shortening the sample, the realized return 
series in each panel becomes more realistic, with the average highest annual rate of 
return across all the panels at approximately 6%, as compared to a value close to zero 
for data in Table 1. However, focusing on the risk–return relationship, the results do 
not follow the classic portfolio theory, but exhibit patterns similar to those in Table 1. 
If stocks are sorted by relative downside beta, the returns follow a U-shaped pattern 
from the low-beta to the high-beta portfolio. The annual rate of return of the lowest 
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relative downside beta portfolio is 4.19%, falling dramatically to 1.9% when the 
relative downside beta increases to the next brackets. Then, the rate of return starts to 
increase from the median beta portfolio at 2.36% finally reaching 2.53% for the 
highest relative downside beta portfolio. Despite a 0.9% drop between the annual 
returns of the second-highest and the highest relative downside beta portfolios, a 
U-shaped pattern in returns is still clearly observed.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Overall, while Table 2 shows a risk and return relationship similar to that of Table 1, 
the pattern of returns is still contrary to the conventional risk–return theory, 
furthermore, a U-shaped pattern is observed if stocks are sorted by relative downside 
beta. Moreover, the return values in Table 2 are much greater than the ones in Table 1 
and are quite close to the expected excess returns, a phenomenon that can be 
attributed to removal of the subprime crisis period. 
 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2, it is clear that although shortening the sample size still 
does not give the expected result, the annual returns appear more typical. For a further 
analysis of the risk–return relationship in view of Tables 1 and 2, all periods of 
financial crises are excluded, and a number of subsamples are considered. 
 
The sample excluding the subprime crisis, the Dot-com crash and the “1989 
market crash” 
The data used to produce Table 3 are consistent with those used for Table 2, and 
exclude the subprime crisis (January 2008 to December 2010), the Dot-com crash 
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(March 2000 to October 2002) and the “1989 stock market crash” (October 1989). 
Bredin et al. (2007), Gregoriou et al. (2009) and Nneji et al. (2011) also focus on the 
crash periods in the UK equity market, however, neither of these studies specifically 
examine the downside risk. If stocks are sorted by beta, the returns exhibit a 
downward pattern with increasing beta values. Such a downward pattern is similar to 
ones observed in Tables 1 and 2, however, the spread between returns of the highest 
beta and the lowest beta portfolios is much narrower than the corresponding spread in 
the previous two tables, at only -2.98% compared to -4.76% in Table 1 and -6.88% in 
Table 2. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The difference between the return of the lowest beta portfolio in Panel 1 of Table 3 
and the respective one in Table 2 is very small. However, the returns of the highest 
beta portfolios in Panel 1 of both tables are obviously very different, with the return in 
Table 3 of 2.98% per annum compared to the respective figure in Table 2 at only -0.93% 
per annum and the spread becoming narrower due to the increased return of the 
highest beta portfolio. Moreover, the returns of three middle-beta portfolios in Panel 1 
of Table 3 are all relatively higher than those in Table 2. Although not as high as 
expected, the increase in the return of the highest-beta portfolio observed after 
discarding abnormal stock price movements during crisis period tends to change the 
return pattern. Apart from Panel 1, the pattern in the risk-return relationship observed 
in the other panels in Table 3 is fairly similar to that in Table 2. 
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Moreover, when stocks are sorted by relative downside beta, there is a clear U-shaped 
pattern in returns, without a small drop that appears in both Tables 1 and 2 for the 
highest relative beta portfolio. Furthermore, when stocks are sorted by ( β- -β+), the 
upward pattern in returns appears similarly to those in Tables 1 and 2. However, the 
spreads between returns of the highest-beta and the lowest-beta portfolios in each 
panel in Table 3 are much lower than the corresponding spreads in Table 2, except 
when stocks are sorted by (β- -β+). Nonetheless, returns of the lowest-beta portfolios 
in both tables are quite close. In other words, the narrowing of spreads is due to the 
increase in returns of the highest-beta portfolio. As the only change made to the 
dataset is the omission of the crisis periods, it can be concluded that bear market 
periods indeed have a great impact on high than on low-beta stocks. 
 
The Dot-com crash 
To explore the impact of stock price movements during crisis periods on the risk–
return relationship, the analysis specific to the Dot-com crash from March 2000 to 
October 2002 is conducted. The results are shown in Table 4. Unsurprisingly, stocks 
suffered huge losses, on average, over this period. Regardless of whether stocks are 
sorted by beta, downside beta, upside beta, relative downside beta and relative upside 
beta, none of the resulting portfolios generate a positive rate of return, while the 
spreads between the high-beta and low-beta portfolios are rather wide, from -18.77% 
to -29.78%. The five panels show that the highest-beta portfolio generates the lowest 
rate of return. If stocks are sorted by conventional beta, the highest-beta portfolio 
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generates the lowest rate of return among all portfolios.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Focusing on the pattern of returns, a downward pattern appears in the first five panels 
when the corresponding beta measurement increases. In addition, the previously 
mentioned U-shaped return pattern, observed if stocks are sorted by relative downside 
beta, disappears and is replaced by a downward pattern. As in previous tables, if 
stocks are sorted by ( β--β+), the upward pattern of returns is observed again with 
all-negative values. Overall, Table 4 shows that abnormal stock price movements do 
not notably alter the return pattern and the risk–return relationship. However, it is 
clear that stocks, especially those of high-beta portfolios, suffered huge losses during 
the Dot-com crash. It shows again that high-beta stocks are influenced the most when 
downward stock price movements occur. 
 
Time sensitivity and sub-period analysis 
The time sensitivity of the downside risk is observed more clearly in the sub-period 
analysis. The original data are divided into three sub-periods, January 1980 - 
December 1989, January 1990 - December 1999 and January 2000 - December 2010. 
A sub-period could be determined by various benchmarks, with this paper following 
studies of Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006) and Pesce (2015) by using every decade as 
a sub-period in accordance with the conventional determination of economic cycles.  
The results are shown in Tables 5, 6 and 7, respectively. The three tables show that the 
risk-return relationship is quite different in each sub-period. 
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First, there appears to be no steady relationship between return and the corresponding 
beta measurements in Table 5 that covers the 1989 market crash. The pattern of 
returns in each panel is non-linear, with U-shaped patterns being observed and the 
highest-beta portfolios consistently generating negative returns. Second, a different 
pattern of returns is shown in Table 6. When stocks are sorted by conventional beta, 
returns from the low to high-beta portfolios exhibit a downward pattern. The same 
patterns are observed when stocks are sorted by downside, upside and relative upside 
betas. When stocks are sorted by relative downside beta, returns from the low-beta to 
high-beta portfolios exhibit a U-shaped pattern.  
[Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here] 
Results for the period from January 2000 to December 2010, in Table 7, are more 
interesting. Consistently with findings of Ang et al. (2006), when stocks are sorted by 
conventional beta, returns plotted against beta estimates exhibit an upward pattern. 
When stocks are sorted by downside, relative downside, or relative upside beta, or by 
downside beta less upside beta, the upward pattern of returns versus corresponding 
beta measure becomes more evident. Finally, when stocks are sorted by upside beta, a 
clear downward pattern of returns is observed. Overall, this sub-period analysis 
reveals three different risk–return relationships depending on the sample period used. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
To summarize, different types of portfolio return patterns appear when stocks are 
sorted by different beta measurements. The UK stock returns exhibit evidence of time 
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sensitivity, especially during periods of financial crises and periods of low returns. 
When the entire constructed dataset is considered, an inverse pattern in returns versus 
beta appears, contrary to the conventional portfolio theory. 
 
When the sample is shortened, the inverse pattern is still observed, however, the 
spreads between the highest-beta and lowest-beta portfolios become much narrower. 
If periods of notable financial crises are excluded from the dataset, an unexpected 
U-shaped pattern appears in returns of beta-grouped portfolios. In a sub-period 
analysis, three entirely different risk–return relationships are observed. The period 
from January 2000 to December 2010, with the subsample characterized by a long 
bull market, exhibits the risk-return relationship closest to that predicted by the 
conventional portfolio theory. This is difficult to explain but is most likely due to 
boom periods before and after the market slump offsetting the negative impact of the 
bull market.  
 
6  Predictive power of downside beta  
To investigate the predictive power of beta and downside beta, all stocks are sorted 
into five portfolios by values of beta, upside beta and downside beta. The previously 
described methodology is adopted, except that in the current analysis, the relationship 
between risk and excess returns one year in the future is calculated.  
 
Table 8 shows that if stocks are sorted by conventional beta and downside beta, a 
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U-shaped pattern is observed in return versus beta. Notably, the second-lowest beta 
portfolio consistently generates the highest rate of return, while the highest-beta 
portfolio consistently suffers a loss. Overall, the predictive power of downside beta in 
the UK market is weak, however, the medium-ranked betas are consistently a positive 
signal of future returns to investors. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
7   Conclusion 
The UK stock returns exhibit unusual patterns when sorted by regular, downside and 
upside beta even after controlling for beta. If the full-length dataset is used, covering a 
number of financial crises, an inverse pattern of portfolio returns is observed, contrary 
to the classic literature. Such an anomaly can be expected in the short term, however, 
it is clearly demonstrated by this paper to persist in the long-run. To further explore 
this phenomenon, the sub-period analyses performed on modifications of the dataset 
tailored to contain only periods of financial crises and separately, excluding such 
periods, did not result in an observation of a consistent pattern in the risk-return 
relationship, while the predictive power of downside beta was observed to be weak. 
Overall, the UK data is clearly time-sensitive, especially during periods of financial 
crises. Moreover, high values of regular and downside betas have a negative impact 
on future returns. The inverse risk-return relationship indeed needs to be explored 
further. As the data sample is being examined with the primary focus on bear markets, 
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it is suggested that time sensitivity could be a possible reason for the observed 
risk-return anomaly. The unusual risk-return pattern discussed in this paper implies 
that factors not conventionally well considered in asset pricing, such as the downside 
risk and time sensitivity, could have a pivotal impact on stock returns, causing a 
risk-return anomaly contrary to the long-acknowledged classic asset pricing literature. 
The results also suggest that, in the short term, the downside risk could reduce stock 
returns to investors, especially during financial crises. On the other hand, in the long 
term, predicting future returns by using the downside risk indicators such as downside 
beta and relative downside beta is difficult. Nevertheless, this study possesses an 
inevitable limitation: the construction of data sample examined in this paper requires 
each stock to have at least five years of consecutive data, resulting in omission of 
companies that were recently listed or did not stay in business for five years, and 
limiting the sample period, as the sample’s end point in 2010 was chosen to ensure 
that a reasonable number of observations were included. As a result, the sample may 
be biased towards low-volatility stocks, observed to outperform high-volatility stocks 
during the sample period, even as the sample selection attempts to follow the 
pioneering studies of stock returns in the US market. In the course of future research, 
the risk–return relationship and the impact of downside risk in various stock markets 
will be examined, to perform a comprehensive comparison of stock markets with 
similar features and to validate the uniqueness of the anomaly found in the UK stock 
market.  
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  Table 1  Stock Returns Sorted By Factor Loadings (Jan 1980-Dec 2010) 
This table presents the relationship between excess stock returns and factor loadings. The sample 
uses FTSE All Shares from January 1980 to December 2010. The column labeled “return” reports 
the average annual stock returns over one-month gilt rate. “High-Low” reports the difference 
between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. 
 
 Panel 1 Stocks Sorted by β   Panel 2 Stocks Sorted by β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+   Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low 1.94% 0.32 0.51 0.36 1 Low  1.24% 0.36 0.43 0.62 
2 0.66% 0.75 1.07 1.05  2 -0.06% 0.77 1.04 1.14 
3 0.39% 1.00 1.39 1.45  3 0.57% 1.01 1.39 1.47 
4 0.35% 1.24 1.71 1.82  4 -0.06% 1.23 1.73 1.75 
5 High  -2.82% 1.79 2.42 2.71  5 High  -1.19% 1.73 2.50 2.41 
High - Low -4.76% 1.47 1.91 2.36  High - Low -2.43% 1.37 2.07 1.79 
           
 Panel 3 Stocks Sorted by β+  Panel 4 Stocks Sorted by Relative β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+   Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low 3.80% 0.41 0.81 0.19 1 Low  0.30% 0.66 0.65 1.41 
2 0.60% 0.78 1.15 1.00  2 -1.19% 0.86 1.11 1.37 
3 0.34% 1.00 1.38 1.45  3 -0.31% 1.01 1.39 1.49 
4 -0.51% 1.21 1.62 1.87  4 1.04% 1.15 1.67 1.56 
5 High  -3.72% 1.70 2.14 2.88  5 High 0.65% 1.41 2.28 1.55 
High - Low -7.52% 1.29 1.33 2.69  High - Low 0.35% 0.75 1.63 0.14 
           
Panel 5 Stocks Sorted by Relative β+  Panel 6 Stocks Sorted by (β- -β+ ) 
Portfolio Return β β- β+   Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  3.65% 0.66 1.28 0.34 1 Low -3.62% 1.24 1.34 2.45 
2 1.69% 0.83 1.25 1.03  2 -0.91% 1.05 1.34 1.72 
3 0.61% 0.99 1.37 1.44  3 0.73% 0.98 1.35 1.43 
4 -1.14% 1.14 1.47 1.83  4 1.40% 0.91 1.38 1.14 
5 High -4.28% 1.48 1.71 2.74  5 High 2.90% 0.91 1.67 0.65 
High - Low -7.93% 0.82 0.43 2.39  High - Low 6.53% -0.33 0.33 -1.79 
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Table 2  UK Stocks Sorted By Factor Loadings (Jan 1980-Dec 2007) 
This table presents the relationship between excess stock returns and factor loadings. The sample 
uses FTSE All Shares from January 1980 to December 2007. The column labeled “return” reports 
the average annual stock returns over one-month gilt rate. “High-Low” reports the difference 
between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. 
 
 Panel 1 Stocks Sorted by β   Panel 2 Stocks Sorted by β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+   Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  5.95% 0.30 0.49 0.31 1 Low 5.43% 0.35 0.41 0.56 
2 3.91% 0.73 1.05 0.98  2 3.11% 0.74 1.02 1.07 
3 3.00% 0.98 1.37 1.38  3 3.01% 0.98 1.36 1.41 
4 2.49% 1.20 1.66 1.75  4 2.34% 1.19 1.68 1.67 
5 High  -0.93% 1.74 2.36 2.64  5 High  0.51% 1.68 2.45 2.34 
High - Low -6.88% 1.44 1.87 2.33  High - Low -4.92% 1.33 2.04 1.78 
           
 Panel 3 Stocks Sorted by β+   Panel 4 Stocks Sorted by Relative β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+   Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low 7.38% 0.39 0.78 0.15 1 Low  4.19% 0.64 0.62 1.33 
2 3.64% 0.75 1.12 0.94  2 1.90% 0.84 1.09 1.32 
3 3.01% 0.97 1.35 1.38  3 2.36% 0.99 1.37 1.43 
4 1.97% 1.18 1.58 1.80  4 3.41% 1.12 1.63 1.50 
5 High  -1.59% 1.66 2.09 2.78  5 High  2.53% 1.36 2.22 1.47 
High - Low -8.98% 1.27 1.31 2.64  High - Low -1.67% 0.72 1.60 0.14 
           
 Panel 5 Stocks Sorted by Relative β+  Panel 6 Stocks Sorted by (β- -β+ ) 
Portfolio Return β β- β+   Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low 6.58% 0.62 1.25 0.30 1 Low  -0.66% 1.22 1.32 2.36 
2 4.50% 0.79 1.21 0.97  2 2.13% 1.03 1.32 1.66 
3 3.32% 0.96 1.33 1.37  3 3.35% 0.95 1.32 1.37 
4 1.56% 1.11 1.44 1.75  4 4.12% 0.87 1.34 1.07 
5 High  -1.55% 1.46 1.69 2.65  5 High 5.46% 0.87 1.63 0.60 
High - Low -8.12% 0.84 0.44 2.35  High - Low 6.11% -0.35 0.32 -1.76 
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Table 3  UK Stocks Sorted By Factor Loadings (Excluding Financial Crises ) 
This table presents the relationship between excess stock returns and factor loadings. The sample 
uses FTSE All Shares January 1980 to December 2010 excluding the 1989 market crash (October 
1989), the Dot-com bubble (March 2000 to October 2002) and subprime crisis (January 2008 to 
December 2010). The column labeled “return” reports the annual average stock returns over 
one-month gilt rate. “High-Low” reports the difference between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. 
 
 Panel 1 Stocks Sorted by β   Panel 2 Stocks Sorted by β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low 5.55% 0.31 0.53 0.31  1 Low  5.10% 0.36 0.45 0.56 
2 5.25% 0.73 1.08 0.99  2 4.43% 0.76 1.05 1.08 
3 4.19% 0.98 1.40 1.38  3 4.17% 0.98 1.40 1.39 
4 3.10% 1.21 1.71 1.73  4 3.41% 1.20 1.73 1.68 
5 High  2.57% 1.71 2.40 2.53  5 High 3.54% 1.65 2.49 2.22 
High - Low -2.98% 1.40 1.87 2.23  High - Low -1.56% 1.29 2.05 1.66 
           
 Panel 3 Stocks Sorted by β+   Panel 4 Stocks Sorted by Relative β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  7.19% 0.39 0.82 0.17  1 Low 4.32% 0.65 0.65 1.28 
2 5.01% 0.75 1.16 0.95  2 3.43% 0.84 1.11 1.28 
3 3.99% 0.98 1.40 1.37  3 3.24% 0.99 1.40 1.42 
4 3.00% 1.19 1.63 1.78  4 4.54% 1.12 1.67 1.50 
5 High  1.47% 1.64 2.12 2.67  5 High  5.11% 1.35 2.29 1.46 
High - Low -5.73% 1.25 1.30 2.50  High - Low 0.79% 0.70 1.64 0.18 
           
Panel 5 Stocks Sorted by Relative β+   Panel 6 Stocks Sorted by (β- -β+ ) 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low 6.98% 0.63 1.32 0.33  1 Low  1.94% 1.18 1.29 2.22 
2 5.55% 0.80 1.26 0.98  2 2.93% 1.02 1.33 1.62 
3 4.08% 0.96 1.37 1.36  3 4.43% 0.96 1.36 1.36 
4 2.64% 1.11 1.48 1.73  4 5.35% 0.89 1.40 1.09 
5 High  1.41% 1.43 1.69 2.54  5 High  6.00% 0.90 1.74 0.66 
High - Low -5.57% 0.80 0.37 2.20  High - Low 4.06% -0.28 0.45 -1.57 
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Table 4  UK Stocks Sorted By Factor Loadings (Mar 2000-Oct 2002) 
This table presents the relationship between excess stock returns and factor loadings. The sample 
uses FTSE All Shares during the Dot-com bubble (March 2000-October 2002). The column 
labeled “return” reports the annual average stock returns over one-month gilt rate. “High-Low”  
reports the difference between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. 
 
 Panel 1 Stocks Sorted by β   Panel 2 Stocks Sorted by β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low -1.64% 0.11 0.23 -0.05  1 Low -2.39% 0.14 0.19 0.23 
2 -13.97% 0.60 0.88 0.82  2 -13.58% 0.61 0.86 0.89 
3 -17.47% 0.94 1.30 1.44  3 -17.19% 0.95 1.30 1.47 
4 -19.04% 1.27 1.71 2.06  4 -21.62% 1.25 1.73 1.94 
5 High -31.44% 2.04 2.64 3.59  5 High  -28.79% 2.01 2.69 3.32 
High - Low -29.79% 1.93 2.41 3.64  High - Low -26.40% 1.86 2.50 3.09 
           
 Panel 3 Stocks Sorted by β+   Panel 4 Stocks Sorted by Relative β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  -4.13% 0.19 0.49 -0.23  1 Low  -4.73% 0.48 0.43 1.26 
2 -13.21% 0.62 0.93 0.79  2 -15.91% 0.74 0.97 1.28 
3 -16.67% 0.94 1.29 1.46  3 -17.57% 0.95 1.30 1.49 
4 -18.86% 1.24 1.62 2.12  4 -20.65% 1.21 1.68 1.83 
5 High  -30.69% 1.97 2.43 3.72  5 High  -24.73% 1.58 2.38 2.00 
High - Low -26.56% 1.78 1.94 3.95  High - Low -20.00% 1.10 1.95 0.74 
           
Panel 5 Stocks Sorted by Relative β+   Panel 6 Stocks Sorted by (β- -β+ ) 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low -9.70% 0.39 0.85 -0.10  1 Low -24.94% 1.54 1.74 3.28 
2 -12.81% 0.64 0.97 0.80  2 -15.44% 1.15 1.47 2.04 
3 -13.94% 0.93 1.27 1.45  3 -15.12% 0.91 1.24 1.43 
4 -18.62% 1.20 1.54 2.10  4 -14.38% 0.72 1.08 0.89 
5 High  -28.47% 1.80 2.14 3.61  5 High  -13.69% 0.65 1.24 0.21 
High - Low -18.77% 1.41 1.29 3.72  High - Low 11.24% -0.89 -0.50 -3.07 
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Table 5  UK Stocks Sorted By Factor Loadings (Jan 1980-Dec 1989) 
This table presents the relationship between excess stock returns and factor loadings. The sample 
uses FTSE All Shares from January 1980 to December 1989. The column labeled “return” reports 
the annual average stock returns over one-month gilt rate. “High-Low” reports the difference 
between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. 
 
 Panel 1 Stocks Sorted by β   Panel 2 Stocks Sorted by β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  2.14% 0.41 0.61 0.53  1 Low  2.40% 0.45 0.56 0.74 
2 1.07% 0.78 1.06 1.15  2 0.97% 0.79 1.05 1.20 
3 2.51% 0.96 1.30 1.42  3 1.87% 0.96 1.30 1.45 
4 2.13% 1.11 1.50 1.65  4 1.11% 1.10 1.52 1.58 
5 High  -2.73% 1.42 1.94 2.08  5 High  -1.26% 1.38 2.00 1.86 
High - Low -4.87% 1.01 1.33 1.55  High - Low -3.66% 0.93 1.44 1.12 
           
 Panel 3 Stocks Sorted by β+   Panel 4 Stocks Sorted by Relative β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  2.78% 0.48 0.82 0.39  1 Low  2.54% 0.66 0.71 1.31 
2 0.94% 0.81 1.16 1.10  2 1.13% 0.84 1.08 1.36 
3 1.73% 0.96 1.31 1.41  3 1.78% 0.96 1.29 1.42 
4 2.04% 1.09 1.44 1.69  4 1.41% 1.03 1.47 1.40 
5 High  -2.37% 1.34 1.69 2.23  5 High  -1.76% 1.19 1.86 1.33 
High - Low -5.15% 0.86 0.87 1.84 High - Low -4.31% 0.52 1.15 0.01 
           
Panel 5 Stocks Sorted by Relative β+   Panel 6 Stocks Sorted by (β- -β+ ) 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  1.83% 0.65 1.15 0.50  1 Low  0.52% 1.01 1.13 1.93 
2 1.46% 0.87 1.26 1.13  2 1.35% 0.97 1.23 1.58 
3 1.43% 0.96 1.31 1.41  3 1.97% 0.95 1.29 1.41 
4 0.91% 1.03 1.32 1.65  4 0.58% 0.90 1.32 1.17 
5 High  -0.55% 1.18 1.39 2.14  5 High  0.66% 0.85 1.46 0.74 
High - Low -2.38% 0.53 0.25 1.64  High - Low 0.14% -0.16 0.33 -1.19 
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Table 6  UK Stocks Sorted By Factor Loadings (Jan 1990-Dec 1999) 
This table presents the relationship between excess stock returns and factor loadings. The sample 
uses FTSE All Shares from January 1990 to December 1999. The column labeled “return” reports 
the average annual stock returns over one-month gilt rate. “High-Low” reports the difference 
between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. 
 
 Panel 1 Stocks Sorted by β   Panel 2 Stocks Sorted by β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  2.59% 0.21 0.37 0.16  1 Low  1.43% 0.27 0.28 0.45 
2 -1.08% 0.68 1.00 0.89  2 -1.41% 0.70 0.96 0.99 
3 -3.03% 0.95 1.35 1.33  3 -2.90% 0.96 1.34 1.37 
4 -3.53% 1.20 1.67 1.75  4 -3.64% 1.18 1.70 1.65 
5 High  -8.02% 1.78 2.47 2.70  5 High  -6.55% 1.72 2.57 2.37 
High - Low -10.61% 1.58 2.10 2.53  High - Low -7.98% 1.45 2.29 1.92 
           
 Panel 3 Stocks Sorted by β+   Panel 4 Stocks Sorted by Relative β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low 3.66% 0.29 0.70 0.01  1 Low  -0.11% 0.56 0.49 1.21 
2 -1.74% 0.69 1.05 0.86  2 -3.44% 0.80 1.04 1.26 
3 -2.33% 0.94 1.33 1.34  3 -3.14% 0.95 1.34 1.37 
4 -3.79% 1.18 1.59 1.79  4 -2.54% 1.11 1.64 1.50 
5 High -8.87% 1.71 2.18 2.83  5 High  -3.85% 1.38 2.34 1.50 
High - Low -12.53% 1.42 1.48 2.81  High - Low -3.74% 0.82 1.86 0.30 
           
Panel 5 Stocks Sorted by Relative β+   Panel 6 Stocks Sorted by (β- -β+ ) 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  1.93% 0.55 1.23 0.19  1 Low  -7.33% 1.19 1.25 2.32 
2 -0.41% 0.74 1.16 0.89  2 -3.45% 1.02 1.31 1.64 
3 -1.28% 0.93 1.31 1.33  3 -1.72% 0.92 1.29 1.32 
4 -4.34% 1.11 1.44 1.75  4 -0.57% 0.84 1.32 1.02 
5 High  -8.95% 1.48 1.70 2.68  5 High  -0.01% 0.84 1.68 0.54 
High - Low -10.88% 0.93 0.47 2.49  High - Low 7.32% -0.35 0.43 -1.78 
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Table 7  UK Stocks Sorted By Factor Loadings (Jan 2000-Dec 2010) 
This table presents the relationship between excess stock returns and factor loadings. The sample 
uses FTSE All Shares from January 2000 to December 2010. The column labeled “return” reports 
the average annual stock returns over one-month gilt rate. “High-Low” reports the difference 
between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. 
 
 Panel 1 Stocks Sorted by β   Panel 2 Stocks Sorted by β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  1.11% 0.37 0.58 0.45  1 Low 0.28% 0.42 0.51 0.71 
2 2.25% 0.81 1.15 1.14  2 0.72% 0.83 1.13 1.25 
3 2.66% 1.09 1.50 1.59  3 3.42% 1.09 1.50 1.60 
4 3.31% 1.38 1.88 2.01  4 2.99% 1.37 1.89 1.96 
5 High  2.67% 2.03 2.68 3.15  5 High  4.59% 1.98 2.76 2.82 
High - Low 1.56% 1.66 2.10 2.70  High - Low 4.31% 1.56 2.25 2.10 
           
 Panel 3 Stocks Sorted by β+   Panel 4 Stocks Sorted by Relative β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  4.62% 0.49 0.91 0.24  1 Low  -0.73% 0.77 0.77 1.69 
2 2.87% 0.84 1.24 1.08  2 -0.31% 0.92 1.19 1.50 
3 2.29% 1.08 1.48 1.58  3 1.34% 1.11 1.51 1.66 
4 1.33% 1.34 1.78 2.08  4 4.63% 1.28 1.82 1.73 
5 High  0.89% 1.93 2.38 3.36  5 High  7.07% 1.60 2.49 1.75 
High - Low -3.73% 1.43 1.47 3.12  High - Low 7.80% 0.83 1.71 0.06 
           
Panel 5 Stocks Sorted by Relative β+   Panel 6 Stocks Sorted by (β- -β+ ) 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  -2.74% 1.43 1.56 2.91  1 Low  -2.39% 1.45 1.58 2.92 
2 -0.03% 1.13 1.44 1.89  2 0.32% 1.14 1.45 1.90 
3 2.19% 1.05 1.45 1.56  3 2.54% 1.07 1.46 1.57 
4 3.68% 0.99 1.48 1.22  4 4.03% 1.00 1.49 1.23 
5 High  7.14% 1.02 1.80 0.71  5 High  7.49% 1.03 1.81 0.72 
High - Low 9.54% -0.43 0.22 -2.22  High - Low 9.89% -0.42 0.23 -2.20 
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Table 8  UK Stocks Sorted By Factor Loadings With Future Excess Return 
This table presents the relationship future excess stock returns and factor loadings. The sample 
uses FTSE All Shares from January 1980 to December 2009, the following year’s excess returns 
are taken as the future excess return. The column labeled “return” reports the average annual 
future stock returns over one-month gilt rate. “High-Low” reports the difference between portfolio 
5 and portfolio 1. 
 
 Panel 1 Stocks Sorted by β   Panel 2 Stocks Sorted by β- 
Portfolio Return β β- β+  Portfolio Return β β- β+ 
1 Low  3.44% 0.30 0.49 0.31  1 Low  2.88% 0.35 0.41 0.56 
2 4.01% 0.73 1.05 0.98  2 4.49% 0.74 1.02 1.07 
3 2.95% 0.98 1.37 1.38  3 3.25% 0.98 1.36 1.41 
4 1.62% 1.20 1.66 1.75  4 1.40% 1.19 1.68 1.67 
5 High  -3.43% 1.74 2.36 2.64  5 High -3.43% 1.68 2.45 2.34 
High - Low -6.87% 1.44 1.87 2.33  High - Low -6.31% 1.33 2.04 1.78 
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